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ABSTRACT
This conclusion provides a comparative survey of the main findings of this 
special issue and suggests avenues for further research. It shows that the security–
stability nexus through which the EU approaches the Southern 
Mediterranean has experienced some measure of reframing in the wake of the 
Arab uprisings. While leading the EU towards a more inclusive approach, this 
partial frame redefinition has on the whole translated into forms of highly 
selective engagement. This conclusion suggests that this mismatch between 
the change in frame definition and its enactment in different policy areas can 
be accounted for with reference to four factors: institutional sources of policy 
rigidity, time lag, issue politicization and the willingness of Mediterranean 
partners to engage with the EU.
Introduction
The Arab uprisings that started in 2011 were viewed as a moment of crisis 
that could potentially lead to a significant change in the EU’s approach 
towards the Mediterranean region. Not only were the authoritarian regimes 
in power chal-lenged by popular protests, but the policies implemented by 
external actors, including the EU, were also deemed to have failed. Facing 
this new situation, the EU response to the uprisings was presented as aiming 
to address the root causes of the revolts and contribute to the democratic 
development of Southern Mediterranean countries. This resulted in the ‘more-
for-more’ approach and the establishment of some new programmes (e.g., 
SPRING, ENPARD, etc.; European Commission, 2011a, 2011b). However, most 
of the literature agrees that the EU approach in the aftermath of the Arab 
uprisings has been marked by continuity with past policies, only masked with 
a new rhetoric of participation, inclusion and democracy (e.g., Colombo & 
Tocci, 2012; Teti, 2012). It is argued that EU 
policies have only changed cosmetically, but that they continue to favour the 
pursuit of the same EU interests, namely its own security through the stability of 
the Southern Mediterranean. Thus, in strong continuity with its policies of coop-
eration with authoritarian regimes prior to the Arab uprisings, the EU approach 
has remained anchored to a security-driven logic aimed at ensuring stability 
in the region and EU economic profit (e.g., Durac & Cavatorta, 2009; Gillespie & 
Youngs, 2002; Seeberg, 2009; Youngs, 2004). For the literature, hence, there is still 
a rhetoric–practice gap, according to which the EU keeps preaching the impor-
tance of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, but it is ready to turn its 
back to these principles when it comes to protecting its security and ensuring 
stability, which remain the real priorities of the EU in the Mediterranean.
While there is some truth to this argument, as EU policies have hardly under-
gone a complete overhaul, the contributions to this special issue have at least 
qualified this view. The investigation of a number of policy areas and countries 
undertaken here shows more variation than is usually allowed for in the litera-
ture. This variation appears to be greater in the conceptualization and under-
standing of the issues at stake than in actual policy implementation. While 
this might point towards relatively unchanging policy outcomes, the extent of 
rethinking apparent in how the EU engages in specific policy areas suggests 
that a mere instrumentalist understanding positing a rhetoric-practice gap is 
also limited.
With the aim of providing a more granular picture of change and continuity, 
this special issue has thus proposed that the security–stability nexus should 
be considered a master frame shaping the EU approach to the Mediterranean. 
Hence, each contribution has looked at the extent to which the interpretation 
of the security–stability nexus has changed in the wake of the uprisings. This 
decision was based on two elements. On the one hand, as discussed in the intro-
duction, the limitations of existing accounts can at least partly be attributed to 
their tendency to take EU interests as given. A focus on frames, understood as 
ways of interpreting information and simplifying reality by identifying a specific 
problem definition and cause–effect relations, providing possible actions and 
offering a moral evaluation (Bardwell, 1991; Dery, 2000; Entman, 1993; Huber 
1991), appears especially promising, as it allows a problematization of how EU 
interests are understood in different policy domains. On the other hand, as the 
literature on framing usually focuses more on their definition, this special issue 
has also asked how the security–stability master frame has been enacted by 
the EU in its relations with Southern Mediterranean partners. Enactment has 
been addressed with reference to the modalities of EU engagement with MENA 
partners as well as the inclusiveness of this engagement, that is: the range of 
actors involved. Additionally, inasmuch as frames are the result of interactions 
among actors trying to make sense of the surrounding environment, the con-
sequences of engagement on the EU framing of security and stability have also 
been considered.
Lessons learnt: Reframing and selective engagement in EU–
MENA relations
In light of this discussion, some main findings emerge from the comparison of 
all policy areas analysed in this special issue. First, while security and stability 
still feature prominently in the EU approach to different sectors in the region, it 
appears that the security–stability nexus has experienced some partial change 
or reframing (Laws & Rein, 2003). If the security–stability master frame informs 
the EU overall approach, it has been shown that, for example, security and 
stability in the economic area are understood differently than in the case of 
religion and relations with Islamist parties. In the economic sphere, security is 
predominantly defined as the security of investments and activities of EU-based 
companies, which requires political stability, often conflated with regime sta-
bility. In contrast, security takes on an ontological dimension when it comes 
to religious engagement and relations with Islamist actors. Here, the defining 
frame is based on the secular-liberal identity of the EU and the need to have a 
stable cognitive environment that does not challenge the self.
Putting into question static views of EU interests, most contributions have 
shown that there has been a partial change or reframing in the security–stabil-
ity nexus in each policy area in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The clear 
outlier in this respect is (Durac, 2017) contribution on counterterrorism, which 
suggests that regime stability has continued to be at the heart of EU policy in 
this area exactly as it was prior to the uprisings. On this front, the EU appears 
chiefly concerned with the potentially destabilizing effects of genuine regime 
change entailed by democratization, which might lead to a greater terrorist 
threat. At the same time, Durac notes, this short-termist approach props up 
autocratic and repressive regimes, thus reproducing a very fertile environment 
for terrorist recruitment.
It would not be unfair to say that in the majority of cases in which secu-
rity and stability are actually reframed, the understanding of the nexus has 
only been altered at the margins, with the most evident repercussions in terms 
of the method or approach used to pursue security and stability in each spe-
cific area. Thus, while the Arab uprisings have partially challenged underlying 
assumptions about each specific policy, they have not produced a U-turn in EU 
frames. Dandashly (2017) for instance suggests that after the uprisings, the EU 
understanding of democracy promotion has shifted towards ‘deep democracy’, 
but also – and equally importantly – towards a strengthening of the focus on 
‘human security’. At the same time, both these developments are constrained 
and shaped by the persistence of a material understanding of security revolv-
ing around the stability of Southern Mediterranean regimes. In the case of 
religious engagement, instead, Wolff (2017) suggests that in the wake of the 
Arab uprisings the EU approach has been shaped by a twin concern with both 
ontological and traditional security. Interestingly, the scope of the former has 
been broadened, leading the EU to focus more on training its diplomatic staff 
on how to develop a greater sensitivity to religious issues. According to Wolff, 
however, these changes are still essentially geared towards putting the EU in a 
better position to promote its own secular-liberal model, which is still considered 
the best tool for maximizing EU security.
Both Kourtelis (2017) and Roccu (2017) demonstrate that the Arab uprisings 
have clearly questioned the EU’s assumptions about security and stability. In the 
case of financial reforms, Roccu shows that the Arab uprisings led to a reframing 
of the idea of stability for the EU, which went beyond the stability of the regime 
to include the concept of ‘deep democracy’ and the job creation functions of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Despite a changed perception in the 
types of needs, however, an ordoliberal template remains the preferred method 
to push for reforms and change in the region. Minor changes have also been 
observed by Kourtelis in the agricultural sector, where food, environmental and 
political security are still at the heart of the EU approach. However, in the wake 
of the uprisings, these elements are now understood in a way that has led the 
EU to pursue an integrated approach to agricultural development that is more 
inclusive, comprehensive and bottom-up, at least on paper. Not dissimilarly, in 
her discussion of reframing, Herranz-Surrallés (2017) argues that the market lib-
eral frame that has long characterized energy policy has been partially modified, 
as the preference for energy market integration prior to the uprisings is now 
complemented by a stronger emphasis on the need to ensure energy supplies 
due to geopolitical concerns.
More visible changes in the master frame can be seen both in EU relations 
with Islamist parties, and in EU migration governance. With respect to the former, 
Voltolini and Colombo (2017) show that, while security and stability continue 
to be perceived in ontological terms, the EU does not apply a black-or-white 
approach to political Islam anymore, which in the past had led to the catego-
rization of all Islamists as a potential threat to the EU’s identity. Instead, it has 
adopted a more nuanced view of security, according to which some forms of 
political Islam are not a threat to the EU’s identity and can thus be engaged 
with. Migration governance arguably provides the case in which the refram-
ing has been most extensive. Here, Geddes and Hadj-Abdou (2017) detect the 
emergence of a ‘new normal’, based on accepting the fact that the EU faces and 
will likely keep facing migratory pressures at its Mediterranean borders. This 
points towards migration becoming comparatively more relevant in how the 
EU defines security and stability in its relations with MENA partners.
Second, the EU has demonstrated its intention to be more inclusive and 
engage with a broader range of actors. This seems to be one of the main changes 
in the EU approach across policy areas, as in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings 
the EU finds it necessary to reach out to a wide variety of actors, and include 
them either into the policy-making process or as potential beneficiaries of 
its policies. Economically, the EU has aimed to go beyond the narrow range 
of actors involved before 2011. This was clear in its promotion of Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas as well as in the inclusion of SMEs in several 
sector programmes, such as ENPARD and the Risk Capital Facility discussed, 
respectively, by Kourtelis and Roccu. Similarly, democracy promotion activities 
have enhanced the number of tools targeting civil society organizations (CSOs), 
increasingly perceived as key to fostering democratic transitions in the region 
(Dandashly). A broader scope of engagement with religious actors, especially 
Islamist actors, has also become a linchpin of the EU policy after the Arab upris-
ings, with respect to both party politics (Voltolini and Colombo) and relations 
with institutionalized forms of religion (Wolff). Some hints at shifting towards 
a more inclusive policy are also visible in the energy sector, where NGOs and 
the academia have indicated the need for a more developmental and inclusive 
approach (Herranz-Surrallés). The aim of greater inclusiveness is also visible in 
the migrant-centred perspective envisaged in the ‘Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility’, which additionally opened the way for more sustained dialogue 
at the regional level (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou). Again, the EU intention to keep 
a regime-centric focus appears confirmed only with reference to counterter-
rorism (Durac).
Third, this greater emphasis on inclusion is consequential for the more gen-
eral direction of EU policies towards the Southern Mediterranean. Evidence 
from most chapters however appears to dispel the view that engagement with 
a broader range of actors translates into more substantial policy change. In 
the more economic spheres, in fact, all inclusionary moves have gone towards 
reinforcing, and indeed broadening and deepening, the same economic model. 
Herranz-Surrallés is perhaps slightly more open to the possibility of productively 
accommodating alternative views within the market liberal model governing 
energy relations than Roccu is on ordoliberal influences. However, the broad 
thrust towards re-iterating in marginally different terms the same template for 
economic cooperation and development, in a process of ‘failing forward’, very 
much permeates both accounts, as well as Kourtelis’ one on agriculture. In migra-
tion governance (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou), religious diplomacy (Wolff) and 
democracy promotion (Dandashly), moves towards greater inclusion appear 
in fact entirely compatible with the further securitization of the issues at stake, 
something that has always been the case for counterterrorism, as evidenced by 
Durac. Here, the only outlier appears to be the greater engagement with parties 
in power perceived as moderate representatives of political Islam (Voltolini and 
Colombo). Even in this case, however, the main driver appears to be the need to 
find new interlocutors to cooperate with, as part of the broader ‘pragmatist’ turn 
now officially enshrined in the EU Global Strategy (2016). This finding on policy 
direction does not necessarily lead us towards the dominant plus ça change view. 
Rather, it points towards how the understanding of security has been broadened 
in almost all sectors under consideration. Being one of its defining elements, 
this inevitably affects also how the security–stability nexus is understood, and 
hence how it can be pursued and enacted differently.
However, and this is the fourth finding of the special issue, the enactment – 
studied here especially in the form of engagement – shows that the EU’s inten-
tion to be more inclusive has largely remained on paper, as in most cases the 
number and types of actors actually involved has not significantly changed in 
practice. As shown in the contributions, most of the previous patterns of engage-
ment have continued to shape EU policies. Both Kourtelis and Roccu show that, 
despite the idea of opening up to a wider range of actors, EU policies follow 
similar exclusionary logics to the ones pursued before the Arab uprisings. This 
is visible in as diverse sectors as agriculture and migration governance, where 
the pledge for greater inclusion has translated into more engagement with 
EU-based actors, respectively, in the form of think-tanks and EU-based agricul-
tural SMEs in the case examined by Kourtelis, and in the greater weight attrib-
uted to migrant destination countries detailed by Geddes and Hadj-Abdou. As 
shown by Herranz-Surrallés, energy policy has followed a similar pattern, as the 
attempts to make it more inclusive and sensitive to developmental issues have 
not really borne their fruit, with energy still circumscribed to state actors, indus-
try representatives and financial institutions. Interestingly, even in the case of 
democracy promotion and engagement with Islamist actors, where one might 
expect stronger evidence of inclusion, the picture is mixed. Here, engagement 
is selective across as well as within countries. As Dandashly demonstrates, civil 
society is more engaged in the case of Tunisia and much less so in the case of 
Egypt. And even in the former case, engagement remains EU-driven, with its 
real outreach in terms of targeted population yet to fully materialize. In the 
case of Islamist actors, Voltolini and Colombo show that political Islam is distin-
guished into three categories and that only moderate actors are engaged with. 
However, these categories are fluid as highlighted by the ease with which the 
EU has moved from engagement to disengagement in the space of a few years 
in the Egyptian case. Along similar lines, Wolff suggests that new practices of 
religious diplomacy have hitherto taken mostly inward-looking forms, such as 
the provision of specific training for EEAS’ and member states’ diplomats, while 
engagement with Southern Mediterranean partners still sees regime-controlled 
institutionalized religion as the key point of reference. Thus, one can see that 
engagement remains selective across the board, and highly so in certain areas, 
as documented by Durac with reference to counterterrorism.
The final finding is that this selectivity is also shaped by the willingness of 
Southern Mediterranean partners to deepen their engagement with the EU. This 
is evident if one pits the Egyptian case against the Tunisian one. As evidenced by 
Roccu, all Egyptian governments in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, with a 
partial exception for the first period of the Morsi presidency, were less interested 
in cooperating with the EU on the terms it proposed. Not only is the EU less 
attractive, but Egypt has a wider choice of potential partners. Moreover, having 
further centralized external relations in the post-Mubarak era, the government is 
in a much stronger position to decide with whom the EU can engage. This is also 
reflected in the case of democracy promotion discussed by Dandashly. The fact 
that the EU engages less with CSOs in Egypt is mainly due to the government’s 
policy and the constraints it imposes on these actors. Exerting a strong control 
over its population and its organizations, the Egyptian government is indeed 
in the position to impose exclusionary patterns when it comes to EU policies. 
Part of this ability is due to the EU’s perceived necessity to keep Egypt on its 
side in migration control and in the fight against terrorism. In contrast to Egypt, 
successive Tunisian governments have been more interested in engaging with 
the EU in their transition process. This emerges when we analyse EU democ-
racy promotion, where civil society is much more involved in EU programmes 
(Dandashly). The same applies to EU’s political engagement with Islamist actors. 
While Salafists are still kept at arm’s length, due to the perceived threat that they 
might pose to the EU’s identity and values, the relations with Ennahda have 
progressively improved and the EU has cooperated with the party on a stable 
basis (Voltolini and Colombo).
The persistence of selective engagement in the light of at least partial refram-
ing of the security–stability nexus provides an interesting puzzle of its own. To be 
sure, selective engagement is not necessarily negative in itself. An improved abil-
ity on the part of the EU to select appropriate interlocutors in partner countries 
might bode well in two respects. On the one hand, it might signal greater clarity 
with respect to the objectives that the EU aims to pursue in the Mediterranean 
region, as well as to the local actors best suited to help the EU achieve them. On 
the other hand, more reliance on selective and targeted engagement might also 
mean greater awareness of the differentiation between and within countries 
in the region, thus creating the platform for a move away from the ‘one-size-
fits-all’ model of the past (Bicchi, 2006). On both these fronts, the proclaimed 
pragmatist turn embodied by the EUGS might signal a move in this direction. 
At the same time, selective engagement can also be problematic, especially in 
those circumstances in which this is forced upon the EU by partner countries, 
thus preventing it from engaging with as broad a range of actors as it would 
otherwise be the case. In these cases, selective engagement might actually 
suggest a weakening of the EU ability to achieve its own goals in the region. In 
the light of the variety of forms and meanings that selective engagement can 
take, and in the light of its position as common denominator in the enactment 
of the security–stability master frame in the wake of the Arab uprisings, it is 
all the more important to understand what might account for the mismatch 
between frame (re-)definition and its enactment.
Beyond the rhetoric-practice gap: Accounting for the 
mismatch between defining and enacting frames
The findings outlined above thus point towards some degree of change, which 
varies across countries and policy areas, in how the EU understands the secu-
rity–stability nexus in its relations with Southern Mediterranean partners. This 
has led to a much greater willingness on the part of the EU to engage with a 
broader range of local actors. However, contributions also agree that the enact-
ment of these changes has been limited at best. Here, one could easily object: 
if there is little to no change in terms of actual policies, does this not amount 
to yet another iteration of the rhetoric-practice gap? If we take the relation 
between discourse and practice as one between input and output within a 
black box, we might well come to this conclusion. However, such an approach 
falls in the trap of deriving ‘real’ intentions – then pitted against ‘rhetorical’ ones 
– from observed outcomes, despite the increasing awareness that ‘assumptions 
about motives based on the observed outcome of a process are not necessarily 
accurate’ (Geddes & Hadj-Abdou, 2017, this special issue). This is also because a 
backward inference from outcome to intention entirely bypasses unintended 
consequences. Indeed, one of the underlying threads of this special issue is 
the weight granted to contextual factors, which might interact with EU poli-
cies and initiatives to produce outcomes far from the ones the EU favours. In 
the attempt of addressing this shortcoming, frames appear as a more promis-
ing mid-range concept. Through the study of their definition, redefinition and 
enactment through engagement with Southern Mediterranean partners, one 
can break down the black box leading from intention to outcomes, and hence 
examine potential ‘blockages’ limiting – or inhibiting altogether – the enactment 
of partially revised frames.
Reframing is inherent to the interactive nature of the framing process. As 
they define frames as ‘a special type of story that focuses attention and provides 
stability and structure by narrating a problem-centred discourse as it evolves 
over time’ (2003: 174), Laws and Rein are inherently suggesting that frames are 
not static, and that thus reframing can take place to make sense of a changing 
situation in times of uncertainty (cf. Goffman, 1974). Laws and Rein also high-
light that frames do not remain confined to the realm of ideas, but are rather 
embodied in practices, i.e., ‘an interdependent body of intuitions, categories, 
commitments and actions’ (2003: 178). As they are institutionalized over time, 
practices create patterns of behaviour that tend to resist reflection also in the 
face of new and uncertain circumstances. This is a line of argument pursued 
especially successfully by Herranz-Surrallés (2016) in her work on EU energy 
policy towards Southern and Eastern Mediterranean partners, where she detects 
a significant change in the EU’s background ideational abilities (cf. Schmidt, 
2008). However, this is not matched by a corresponding change in practices, 
still shaped by the more traditional division of labour between the EU’s energy 
governance approach and the national energy diplomacies.
In light of this emerging literature, four factors can provisionally be advanced 
here as potential contributors to the mismatch between the redefinition of 
the security–stability nexus in the wake of the Arab uprisings and the relative 
continuity in terms of practices, and thus in the enactment of the security–sta-
bility master frame. Firstly, the institutional dimension is always important in 
this respect, and particularly so in the EU case, as it might constitute a source 
of resistance to policy change even when the framing of the policy issue has 
changed. Three institutional elements play this role in the cases examined in 
this special issue. As suggested by historical institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 
1996; Pierson, 2000), a first source of resistance might emergence from the 
path dependency deriving from the policy legacies of the past. This is visible 
for instance in the resilience of ordoliberal ideas and practices identified by 
Roccu with reference to economic reforms, but also of institutional practices 
still reflecting the market liberal frame in the energy sector as discussed by 
Herranz-Surrallés. A second source of resistance to change despite reframing 
might instead derive from the power positions gained within policy-making by 
specific groups, such as EU-based agricultural and financial companies (Kourtelis 
and Roccu respectively). While perhaps unable to contest the reframing of secu-
rity and stability in their own sector, these actors are still in a position to slow 
down policy changes that might affect their perceived interests. The third and 
final source of stickiness in practices, and thus in the mismatch between frame 
redefinition and its enactment, is specific to the EU and has to do with the over-
lapping jurisdictions and competences between national and supranational 
levels. This is highlighted especially by Durac and Geddes and Hadj-Abdou with 
reference, respectively, to counterterrorism policy and migration governance.
Secondly, there can be a temporal lag between ideational change and its 
enactment due to the more enduring nature of practices. For example, Laws and 
Rein (2003) show that in the US it took over 20 years to see a change in practices 
following a reframing of the problem of environmental hazards. Similarly, and 
closer to the cases examined here, Voltolini (2016) finds that although a new 
frame in EU–Israel relations already began to emerge in the late 1980s, it took 
around two decades for this to become the dominant understanding in the EU 
and be implemented into concrete policy steps. It might thus well be that it is 
still relatively early to observe a substantial change in frame enactment.
Thirdly, the politicization of specific issues might also affect the ‘transmis-
sion mechanism’ from frame definition to enactment, as different levels of pub-
lic attention and visibility create different pressures on policy-makers to act. 
Following Grande and Hutter (2016: 7), politicization could be defined as the 
‘expansion of the scope of conflict within the political system’. As Hay (2007) 
argues, politicization and depoliticization (as its opposite) imply the movement 
of issues between the arena of fate and necessity (the non-political) to the one 
of deliberation and contingency (the political) (cf. Schmitt, 1966). Despite the 
pressure towards acting that might occur as an issue becomes politicized, the 
way in which this can affect the relation between frame definition and frame 
enactment is not univocal. On the one hand, in the face of perceived policy 
failure, one could expect the increased salience and politicization of events in 
the Mediterranean to produce greater pressures towards policy change. This 
might explain the documents produced by the EU already in 2011, in which 
it took some ownership over policy choices that the uprisings proved to be 
misguided (European Commission, 2011a, 2011b). In times of lower salience 
and politicization, pressures towards substantive policy change might wither. 
This certainly appears the case with reference to ‘deep democracy’ as well as 
‘inclusive development’, increasingly becoming hollow phrases as the attention 
of the public opinion within the EU shifted towards the refugee and migration 
crisis and the threat posed by Daesh/ISIS. On the other hand, high politicization 
might also adversely affect policy change. Indeed, one can argue that the more 
politicized an issue, the more contentious the possible solutions, the higher the 
risk that the reframing does not result in substantive policy change. This is per-
haps best exemplified in the case of EU migration and asylum policy discussed 
by Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, where the issue has been increasingly politicized 
and has become hostage of domestic electoral politics in many member states, 
which are concurrently facing the rise of right-wing parties seeking to foster and 
capitalize upon a fear of migrants. This potentially adverse effect of politicization, 
especially when it leads to a fracture between national and supranational levels, 
is particularly problematic for the EU, which has historically demonstrated to 
thrive upon the depoliticization of issues to be then addressed through tech-
nocratic solutions (Kurki, 2011; Radaelli, 1999).
Finally, given the interactive nature of framing processes as well as the fact 
that engagement is, by definition, relational, one cannot account for the mis-
match between frame definition and enactment without considering how 
Mediterranean countries interact with the EU and to what extent they are will-
ing to engage with it. As mentioned earlier, not all Southern Mediterranean 
countries were interested in engaging with the EU in the aftermath of the 
Arab uprisings. New international actors, such as the Gulf countries, Russia and 
China, have been perceived as better partners than the EU as their financial and 
economic support does not imply any formal conditionality. Moreover, some 
countries have become more vocal in their requests to the EU, pushing for their 
own interests when dealing with the EU and making the terms of cooperation 
less one-sided than before. This is for instance what is detected by Durac in 
counterterrorism policy when he speaks of ‘externalisation in reverse’. Given 
the turbulent times the region is in and the repercussions that are felt in the 
EU, especially in terms of migration and terrorism, it does not come as a total 
surprise that the EU’s ability to implement its policies is shaped and, in some 
cases, hijacked by partner countries and their perceived interests.
Where to from here? Pointers for a future research agenda
As it comparatively assesses the sources and degree of policy change and conti-
nuity in EU relations with Southern Mediterranean partners following the Arab 
uprisings, this special issue contributes directly to the debate suggesting that 
security and stability are still at the heart of the EU approach in the region. 
We contend that while this might well be the case, one also needs to look at 
whether security and stability, and the relation between them – that is: the 
security–stability nexus – are still defined in the same way they were before the 
uprisings. The empirical analysis carried out along a number of countries, poli-
cies and sectors by the individual contributions demonstrate, with a significant 
exception, that the security–stability nexus has at least been reframed in the 
wake of the uprisings. This has also had reverberations on how the objectives of 
security and stability are pursued by the EU, and hence on the range of actors 
that the EU aims to engage with in Southern Mediterranean partner countries. 
Importantly, the special issue also shows that more change has occurred in the 
redefinition of the security–stability master frame than in its actual enactment 
via engagement. However, the empirical material presented suggests that it 
would be misleading to speak simply of continuity, and even more so to derive 
continuity in intentions from a continuity in outcomes.
The special issue also points towards research avenues that might be pur-
sued fruitfully in the future. Two of them are of a more directly empirical nature, 
although they would no doubt also provide interesting theoretical refinements 
to the aspects assessed in this special issue. On the one hand, with direct ref-
erence to these conclusions, the hypothesis of the temporal lag between 
reframing the security–stability nexus and consistently enacting it is one that 
can only be adequately appraised in the future. In this regard, the full roll-out 
of the EU Global Strategy might provide an interesting test of the extent to 
which the reframing of the security–stability nexus is enacted in the Southern 
Mediterranean. On the other hand, while this special issue has focused its 
attention on the relation between frame definition and redefinition and frame 
enactment in the form of engagement, as well as to the feedback effects that 
such engagement generates on the framing of security and stability, there 
are two further links that need to be probed further in future research. One of 
them would go back upstream, so to say, to look at how different modalities of 
engagement, as well as different actors involved in the process, affect the for-
mulation of specific policies on the part of the EU. The other link would instead 
go downstream, and examine how engagement affects policy implementation 
on both the EU and the partner country level.
Through its focus on frames as a mid-range concept that allows researchers to 
eschew the binary distinction between norms and interests, at least two interest-
ing lines of more theoretical inquiry could emerge from the approach proposed 
in this special issue. The first could shift the focus beyond the security–stability 
nexus as the master frame orienting EU policies in the Southern Mediterranean 
and ask whether one can see any contending frame that is gaining relevance in 
how the EU approaches the Mediterranean region. Some of these frames might 
eventually be subsumed by the dominant master frame, as it has occurred so 
far for instance in the case of the ordoliberal approach to economic reforms 
outlined by Roccu, the market liberal frame analysed by Herranz-Surrallés, the 
secular liberal frame discussed by Wolff with reference to religious diplomacy 
and by Dandashly in regard to democracy promotion. However, it cannot be 
excluded in principle that some contending frames might eventually contest 
the hegemonic role hitherto held by the security–stability nexus, however artic-
ulated. This in turn could have profound theoretical implications for debates 
on policy change in EU relations with the Southern Mediterranean, and more 
generally with neighbouring countries, as well as for debates on how ideas and 
power dynamics shape EU external relations.
The second line of theoretical inquiry could explore in more detail the 
cases in which the feedback effect produced by engagement with Southern 
Mediterranean partners translates into a fundamental perversion of the origi-
nal frame. The case of counterterrorism addressed by Durac, and what he calls 
‘externalisation in reverse’ drawing from Eder (2011), demonstrates the extent 
to which partner regimes can exploit informational asymmetries deriving from 
their knowledge of the domestic and/or regional context and use engagement 
to achieve different forms of strategic manipulation of the EU. If more cases of 
this kind would emerge, then questions about the EU role in the Mediterranean, 
but more generally in international politics, might be raised. For instance, do 
these forms of manipulation point towards more general weaknesses of the 
EU as a multi-layered foreign policy actor (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013; Smith, 
2004)? If EU frames fail to resonate among partner countries, and are indeed 
turned back against the EU itself, does this suggest that the soft, civilian and 
normative means on which the EU has historically relied need to be revised, lest 
an inexorable decline in its regional and global influence? Given the dramatic 
transformations experienced by the Arab Mediterranean, it is about time we 
start asking these more foundational questions. This special issue is but a first, 
small, step in this direction.
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